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Abstract 
Although there are thorough bodies of literature which focus on the different 
organizational structures of social movement organizations and how organizations 
cooperate with one another, the American Labor Movement is frequently seen as 
homologous. While challenged frequently in sociological literature, treating labor 
unions as interchangeable ignores the various motivations held by union locals. As 
members of national unions, it is assumed that labor union locals naturally have 
similar levels of participation both in internal campaigns and in their participation 
with other national social movement organizations. Operating on this assumption, 
the study conducted for this article surveyed locals from the Service Employees 
International Union, UNITE HERE, and the Communication Workers of America. 
Rating these different unions as conservative, liberal, and politically radical, this 
study argues that politically radical labor unions are more sympathetic of feminist 
SMOs. However, this study also suggests that the differences in political opinions 
and the organizational structures of broad social movements and social movement 
organizations do not incite different levels of sympathy among labor union locals. 
Supporting the call to action put forth by Lott, this article suggests that there is a 
large body of literature not yet published concerning the psychology of labor 
unions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
Introduction  
The United States has a history of being uniquely conservative when compared to other 
industrialized countries. The idea of ‘American exceptionalism’ presents itself politically and 
socially as the United States has been less receptive of social movements that encourage 
international justice, economic equality, peace, and other progressive ideals (Kelly and 
Lefkowitz 2003, Welch 2003, Sarkees 2003, Carty 2006). This has been documented in a 
country that is both the wealthiest on the planet (Stierli 2015, IMF 2016) and the only 
industrialized nation to have a two-party electoral system (Simmons and Simmons 2003). 
American exceptionalism has expressed itself in the public mind as the belief that the United 
States has achieved “higher levels of human rights” despite the stifling of social movements such 
as the human rights movement and organized labor (Welch 2003).  
 While researchers have done a thorough job of illustrating how economic sanctions and 
political actions have repressed organized labor, there is only a small body of research that has 
given predictive results the labor movement’s future. For example, Swarts and Vasi (2011) have 
shown that social grievances, such as high income inequality and racial segregation, are not 
significantly correlated with a city’s likelihood of adopting a higher minimum wage. Hogler et. 
al. (2014) show a significant correlation between “collective/egalitarian psychology” and less 
stratified income distributions. As an answer to multiple calls (Lott 2013) for more focused 
research on Labor Unions in the United States, this study seeks to find the political aspects of a 
Labor Union that make its members more likely to organize both for its constituents and for the 
general public.  
 
American Labor and Economic Inequality  
Interestingly, high levels of economic inequality are also uniquely American when 
compared to other industrialized western countries (Jacobs and Myers 2014). Numerous 
researchers have identified a correlation between the current low unionization rate and for the 
current high level of wealth inequality in the United States (Hogler et. al. 2015, Western and 
Rosenfeld 2011, Jacobs and Myers 2014). This is not surprising when looking at the history of 
organized labor in the United States. 
At the height of the Labor Movement in the early 1960’s nearly 1 in 3 workers in private 
industry were unionized (Hogler et. al. 2015, Weeden et. al. 2007, Ness 2003), with certain 
industries like the garment industry having over nearly half of its workers unionized (Carty 
2006). However, since this peak there has been a steady decrease in the union membership rates 
and a steady increase in economic inequality to the point that earnings fell for 90% of Americans 
between 2010 and 2013 (Hogler et. al. 2015). 
While the decline of organized labor has been ongoing since the 1960’s, the rise of 
income inequality in U.S. has increased at a singular rate since the 1980’s (Jacobs and Myers 
2014). This suggests that the rise of Neoliberalism (beginning with the policies of the Reagan 
Administration) poses a serious threat to the already wounded Labor movement. Tope and 
Jacobs (2009) found that once the Reagan administration entered the White House that union 
recognition elections fell sharply due to the notorious PATCO layoff, and Piketty and Saez 
(2007) found that progressive tax policies have been declining in the U.S. federal tax system 
since 1970. Jacobs and Myers (2014) found that macroeconomic policies since 1983 have 
stressed curbing inflation of the dollar at the cost of raising the unemployment rate.  
Linking the labor movement to the general public makes logical sense. After all, 
researchers such as Jacobs and Myers (2014) find that Labor unions not only decrease earnings 
differences between employees in the same firm, but are also strong advocates for public policies 
that benefit the poor. In fact, it is disputed whether the SEIU helped to create or simply adopted 
the Fight for Fifteen minimum wage campaign (Gupta 2013). This supports the idea that 
organized labor unions are social advocates, because contrary to popular belief, Easton (2001) 
finds that non-unionized, less educated workers benefit the most from increases in the minimum 
wage.  
Unions, Fear, and Sympathy 
An ethnographic analysis done by Hodson et. al. (2013) shows private companies today 
have a tendency to follow a ‘Kafkaesque model of bureaucracy’ instead of Weber’s traditional 
bureaucratic model. This Kafkaesque bureaucracy is characterized by strict adherence to policies 
that indirectly encourage elite control, the proliferation of specific and contradicting policies that 
confuse and ultimately disenfranchise workers, the unquestionable and indisputable goal of profit 
maximization, the subjugation of low level employees through abuses of legitimatized power, 
and the instilling of fear of punishment. While the main finding of Hodson et. al.’s (2013) study 
is not surprising, it is important to emphasize the fear aspect of Kafkaesque bureaucracy, because 
fear of termination is a major deterrent in unionization elections (Lott 2014, Cooper and Sureau 
2008, Carty 2006, Jacobs and Myers 2014).  
In fact, Western and Rosenfeld’s article “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality” (2011) makes a thorough case that privatization and fear naturally lead to the 
concentration of wealth. Western and Rosenfeld’s study (2011) shows that declining 
unionization rates explain roughly 20% to 33% of the rise of wage inequality between 1973 and 
2007, and also suggests that unions established “norms of equity that claimed the fairness of a 
standard rate for low-pay workers and the injustice of unchecked earnings for managers and 
owners.” Because they establish these norms, Labor Unions are also arguably the most important 
advocates for redistributive public policies that benefit the less affluent.  
Scare tactics are as common as dandelions when it comes to employers fighting the 
unionization of their employees, but employers are not the only people that utilize these forms of 
anti-unionization. In There is Power in a Union: The Epic Story of Labor in America (2010) 
public historian Philip Dray gives numerous historical accounts of how the Labor Movement 
came into being in the United States, and how the movement has been fought against by the 
wealthy and the political elite outside business management. Beginning this history with the 
Lowell Mill Girls strikes of 1834 and 1836 Dray (2010) gives many examples of how fear has 
been used since the 1850’s to resist Labor efforts in America; in fact, from the various accounts 
that Bray cites only one does not mention scare tactics used to stifle organizational tactics. 
Bray’s 674-page text does not limit itself to employers using these scare tactics, but on the 
contrary refers to mass media, government officials, and even fellow employees who instill fear. 
Cooper and Sureau’s article “Teacher Unions and the Politics of Fear in Labor Relations” 
(2008) addresses the use of fear in stifling collective action not in privatized companies, but 
within public education. Addressing how teachers used tactics of striking and appealing to the 
general public Cooper and Sureau’s (2008) case study on teachers unions not only demonstrates 
the benefits that teachers won through collective action, but also suggests that unions are 
ethically beneficial organizations (see also Western and Rosenfeld 2011). This shows that 
employees both in the public and the private sectors of the economy benefit from unionization, 
despite public sector organizations not being marked by Kafkaesque bureaucracies.  
Cooper and Sureau’s article (2008) emphasizes that the Wagner Act of 1944 outlawed 
public servants to unionize and that despite this public employees frequently unionize. Martin 
(2008) suggests that because union members understood that they were violating NLRB 
sanctions by forming new AFT chapters teachers strengthened their efforts and improved their 
chances of making long-lasting, effective change. Along with this, Shepard (2003) illustrates 
how social movements are regularly successful when their constituents identify their movement 
as being related not only to future potential benefits, but to feelings of pleasure. 
As such, we assume that radical labor union locals are likely to be less intimidated by and 
more frequently organize against/collectively bargain with their employers. I define “radical 
labor union” as a union that radically organizes both for the interests of its members and the 
general public. This definition borrows from Day (2004), who defines radical political 
organizing as “mobilizing in opposition to political and social institutions, as well as the laws 
supporting them, through organized resistance and noncompliance.”  
Using past literature (Day 2004, Carty 2006, Wessler 2013, Greenhouse 2015) we 
identify the Communication Workers of America (CWA) as a radical labor union. I also consider 
CWA to be a more radical union due to its democratically determined endorsement of “outsider” 
political candidate Bernie Sanders (Merica 2015), its frequent worker organization campaigns 
(CWA 2013, CWA 2014), and its activism for people outside of its general membership 
(InformationWeek 2007, CWA 2016). 
Additionally, for comparative measures I identify UNITE HERE as less politically 
radical (or as a ‘moderate’ union) based on its presidential endorsements (Ellis 2008, Wheeler 
2016), its issues with its membership base (Ellis 2009), and its previous potential merger with 
the SEIU (Maher 2009(1), Maher 2009(2)). I also identify the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) as a comparatively conservative union with its recent history of association 
with/contributions to the United States Democratic Party (Wessler 2013, Opensecrets.org 2016, 
Lonardo 2016), its revolving door employment practices (Early 2012), and its recent wage 
dispute with Fight for Fifteen organizers (Moberg 2016). 
Social Movement Organizations and Coalitions 
Traditionally labor unions and social movement organizations (hereafter abbreviated 
SMOs) have been studied as separate structures from one another and only recently have the two 
been discussed as entities that share any qualities. In the article “Resource Mobilization and 
Social Movements: A Partial Theory” (1977) McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as “a 
set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some 
elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.” Therefore, an SMO is a 
formalized group of people who act on the beliefs presented by a social movement; such as how 
the Student Labor Action Project (an SMO) takes action motivated by their beliefs in the Labor 
Movement (See Carthy 2006). 
Social movements vary in terms of structure, from social movements that centralize 
around a few choice SMOs and social movements that are decentralized with constituents being 
involved in multiple coalitions. Not only this, but SMOs themselves are often sorted into the 
categories of internal structure that range from the traditional view of SMOs to more pacified, 
formally structured interest groups (Berg 2003). 
One structure of a social movement is not necessarily better than another. Meyer’s The 
Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America (2014) suggests that decentralized movements 
rarely achieve their initially stated goals because of pacification brought on by the lack of 
attention, assimilation into governmental bodies, and the lack of communication inherent to 
decentralized structures. However, Shepard (2003) shows the problems of centralization by 
explaining how the ‘Professionalization of Reform’ often leads to non-effective professional 
groups and how centralized organizations are at high risk of internal fissures. 
Researchers have identified certain conditions that must be met by a social movement for 
it to achieve significant change or its stated goals. Amenta et. al. (2010) identify that while 
greater political influence is not directly correlated with more rank-and-file membership a certain 
number of rank-and-file members are necessary for political influence to be attainable. Along 
with this, other researchers (Tope and Jacobs 2009, Meyer 2004) suggest that a social 
movement’s political success rests on it taking advantage of mutual opportunities with ‘insiders’ 
who hold governmental office.  
Coalitions are the main unifying force between SMOs within the same social movement, 
and more importantly between different social movements themselves. Often coalitions are 
decentralized in structure, and rarely does a single SMO determine the goal or goals of all the 
members of a coalition. In fact, the ‘battle in Seattle’ is exemplary of coalition action as many 
different SMOs from various social movements came together to protest negotiations of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). This coalition formed what later came to be called the second 
wave of the antiglobalization movement (Hayduk 2003). While the protests were successful in 
stifling the WTO convention they also illustrate how contradictory coalitions usually are. 
Describing the protests, Meyer (2014) points out that “Teamsters, ‘black block’ anarchists, 
environmentalists, vegetarian fundamentalists, lesbian feminists, and white nationalists marched 
together in an alliance that must have been uneasy.”  
However, Hayduk (2003) points out that coalitions are often short lived when its 
members do not share any ideological views. Many of the coalitions between the various 
protesters in the ‘Battle in Seattle’ ended when the protests themselves ended. As such, I assume 
that groups who are part of the same social movement (such as a CWA local and an SEIU local) 
are more likely to form coalitions and sympathize with each other. However, what is unclear 
about this is how much of a variance of sympathy there is among different labor movement 
organizations. As such, my first hypothesis can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 1: Radical labor union locals will have more sympathetic views of social 
movements and social movement organizations that seek goals that are different 
from the goals of the labor movement. 
Social Movement Unionism  
Because social movements regularly have informal and decentralized structures 
researchers tend to view the SMOs of ‘traditional’ movements (such as organizations who define 
their ideology and goals) as opposite in structure to special interest groups (Hayduk 2003). 
However, because Labor Unions are commonly centralized by a national office they are 
popularly characterized as formally structured conglomerates akin to special interest groups 
(Ness 2003).  
Social Movement Unionism has emerged as a middle ground between unions and SMOs. 
This new form of Unionism combines militancy, union reform, and alternative forms of 
organizing with traditional methods of addressing labor struggles, and also urges workers in 
various industries to work in solidarity with SMOs, community groups, and activists for better 
working and living conditions (Carty 2006).  
Today, Social Movement Unionism is the growing trend for most unions in the United 
States, and as such the traditionally recognized distinction between ‘traditional’ unions and 
social movement unions is becoming more and more obsolete (Martin and Dixon 2010). 
However, this is further complicated by the fact that social unionism is not an entirely new 
concept. For example, Pfeiffer (2003) explains how the first organizers of the disability 
movement were trained by SMOs of the labor movement.  
Carty (2006) stresses the need for collective identity for organizing campaigns. While 
various organizations create the body of a social movement, what is important is that these 
SMOs set to achieve similar goals to try and influence public opinion (Olson and Davis 2003). 
However, social unionism is needed in the context of the labor movement because many labor 
unions are seen as exclusive organizations that require their member’s time, energy, and 
permeate various aspects of their daily lives (Haussman 2003). As such, I assume that both 
‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ union locals will be more sympathetic towards social movements than 
‘conservative’ locals due to the decentralized structure’s inclusivity. Therefore, my second 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Radical Labor Unions will be more receptive of decentralized social 
movements than they are of SMOs.  
 
Methodology  
My study involved two “rounds” of data collection. The first round of data collection 
was an electronic survey with nonprobability sampling of Presidents1 of labor union locals. 
For convenience, I limited the sample to the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. These states were picked under the assumption that less 
distance between questionnaire and respondent would result in a higher chance of response.  
Before data collection began, contact information was required to distribute the 
survey via e-mail. Over the course of four months I talked to 213 separate labor union locals 
asking for their president’s email address. After four months of contact information 
collection, surveys were sent to 172 email addresses of local presidents and local 
representatives1. 59 of the 172 subjects took the online survey within the allotted month, and 
of those 11 decided to not agree to the initial consent script form required for participation.  
Before taking the survey, respondents were given a consent details form that outlined 
the goals of my research, their rights as a research participant, and the estimated time it 
would take them to complete the survey. As stated previously, 11 potential survey 
respondents decided to back out after reading this consent details form. 
The survey questions that were distributed via email can be divided into the 
categories of personal or local. Composed of 17 listed questions, responding to every 
question creates data for 33 different variables that may be used for testing my hypotheses.  
 Personal questions are those that ask the respondent to give their own beliefs or life 
experiences. While other questions fall into this category, question four (“How favorably do 
you view the following?”) is the main measure used to test my first hypothesis. Question 
four used a simple Likert scale to measure respondent’s opinions on different social 
movements including both centralized SMOs (i.e. National Organization for Women 
(NOW)) and decentralized social movements (i.e. Black Lives Matter (BLM)). Using this 
Likert scale, I compared opinions about movements and SMOs with Kruskal-Wallis H tests. 
These comparisons are shown in figures 1-8. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Due to their internal structures, contacts at UNITE HERE and SEIU came from ‘local representatives’ whose roles 
in their local meetings was roughly equivalent to the role of local presidents in other unions.  
Figures 1-8: Kruskal-Wallis H tests for social movements and SMOs2.  
   
  
  
  
Figure 1 Figure 2 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
Figure 7 Figure 8 
Local questions make up the bulk of the survey’s queries, and ranged from how long 
has their union local existed to how often their local holds member elections.2 Specifically 
question five (“Has your union chapter participated in events or associated with any of the 
following social organizations?”) and question 11 (which asks about the local’s number of 
events with Fight for 15 since 2014) give useful indications of how frequently each union 
local organizes. However, I decided not to use data taken from question 11 because the 
SEIU has a number of explicit links to the Fight for Fifteen movement in their social 
campaigns.  
It is important to note that my second hypothesis specifies radical union locals as a 
subpopulation to be tested. So to test my second hypothesis, I used STATA to test two 
specific populations against each other (CWA members and non-members). These mean 
comparison tests are given in figures 9-16. 
The last question of the survey simply asked whether or not the respondent was 
willing to participate in the second wave (interview portion) of the study. Of the 48 
respondents that reached this point nine responded that they would be willing to participate 
in interviews. However, four of these nine respondents decided to not participate in the 
interview process. Over the course of a month five interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, but two respondents later requested that their interviews not be used. Due to the 
low number of interviews (three), no data was pulled from interviews for qualitative 
analysis. 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that the personal opinions concerning the Bonnie Labor Union Skills (BLUS) organization were 
not included in the reported Kruskal-Wallis tests due to a sample of less than 30; only 23 respondents gave a their 
opinion of BLUS. However, despite this sample size of less than 50% of respondents it should be noted that a KW 
test for “blus_personal” resulted in a probability of roughly 58% (54% with ties) and thus failed to reject 
independence from respondent’s Union Affiliation. 
Figures 9-16: Mean comparisons for social movements and SMOs by CWA membership 
   
 
  
  
 
Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1: Radical labor union locals will have more sympathetic views of social 
movements and social movement organizations that seek goals that are different 
from the goals of the labor movement. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6509         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6982          Pr(T > t) = 0.3491
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.3902
                                                                              
    diff              .1398601    .3584541               -.5816705    .8613908
                                                                              
combined        48    3.333333    .1769855    1.226192    2.977284    3.689382
                                                                              
Non Memb        26    3.269231    .2515043    1.282426    2.751248    3.787214
  Member        22    3.409091    .2519112    1.181568    2.885213    3.932969
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest blm_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2813         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5625          Pr(T > t) = 0.7187
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       42
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =  -0.5838
                                                                              
    diff             -.1818182    .3114628               -.8103755    .4467391
                                                                              
combined        44    4.136364     .154533    1.025056    3.824718    4.448009
                                                                              
Non Memb        22    4.227273    .2175405    1.020356    3.774872    4.679673
  Member        22    4.045455    .2229017    1.045502    3.581905    4.509004
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest ff15_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9969         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0062          Pr(T > t) = 0.0031
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       38
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.8996
                                                                              
    diff              .9466667     .326484                .2857343    1.607599
                                                                              
combined        40       3.875    .1724168     1.09046    3.526254    4.223746
                                                                              
Non Memb        25        3.52    .2244994    1.122497    3.056656    3.983344
  Member        15    4.466667    .1918994    .7432234    4.055083     4.87825
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest hrc_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8090         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3821          Pr(T > t) = 0.1910
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.8825
                                                                              
    diff              .2587413    .2931846               -.3314088    .8488913
                                                                              
combined        48    4.041667    .1457383    1.009705    3.748479    4.334854
                                                                              
Non Memb        26    3.923077    .2069788    1.055389    3.496796    4.349358
  Member        22    4.181818    .2042446    .9579921    3.757068    4.606568
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest naacp_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9966         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0068          Pr(T > t) = 0.0034
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       40
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.8568
                                                                              
    diff              .9244851    .3236049                .2704552    1.578515
                                                                              
combined        42    3.809524     .174568     1.13133    3.456977    4.162071
                                                                              
Non Memb        23    3.391304     .233034    1.117592    2.908021    3.874587
  Member        19    4.315789    .2170056    .9459053    3.859878    4.771701
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest now_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9975         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0051          Pr(T > t) = 0.0025
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       45
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.9459
                                                                              
    diff              1.038462    .3525125                 .328465    1.748458
                                                                              
combined        47    3.425532    .1893186    1.297903    3.044453     3.80661
                                                                              
Non Memb        26    2.961538    .2510334    1.280024    2.444526    3.478551
  Member        21           4    .2390457    1.095445    3.501359    4.498641
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest pp_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4818         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9637          Pr(T > t) = 0.5182
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       35
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =  -0.0459
                                                                              
    diff             -.0176471     .384565               -.7983556    .7630615
                                                                              
combined        37    3.891892    .1889746    1.149487    3.508634     4.27515
                                                                              
Non Memb        20         3.9    .2704772    1.209611    3.333885    4.466115
  Member        17    3.882353    .2695633    1.111438    3.310904    4.453802
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest sas_personal, by(cwa)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5870         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8259          Pr(T > t) = 0.4130
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       39
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.2214
                                                                              
    diff              .0676329    .3054185               -.5501344    .6854001
                                                                              
combined        41    4.073171    .1497569     .958912    3.770501    4.375841
                                                                              
Non Memb        23    4.043478    .2035093    .9759965    3.621426    4.465531
  Member        18    4.111111    .2270713    .9633818    3.632033     4.59019
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest wa_personal, by(cwa)
Figure 9 Figure 10 
Figure 11 Figure 12 
Figure 13 Figure 14 
Figure 15 Figure 16 
The Kruskal-Wallis tests shown above can be separated into social movements and 
SMOs. The subjects shown in figures 1-8 above are Black Lives Matter (movement, fig. 1), 
Fight for 15 (movement, fig. 2), Human Rights Campaign (SMO, fig. 3), National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (SMO, fig. 4), the National 
Organization for Women (SMO, fig. 5), Planned Parenthood (SMO, fig. 6), Students 
Against Sweatshops (SMO, fig. 7), and Working America (SMO, fig. 8). I decided to ask 
respondents about these specific movements and organizations due to their various levels of 
connection to labor unions. While the details of these organization’s relationships differ, I 
use Working America (fig. 8), Students Against Sweatshops (fig. 7), and the Fight for 15 
(fig. 2) as control measures due to their close affiliation with labor unions.  
Surprisingly, figures three, five, and six present a statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
correlations between union affiliation and personal opinion. However, these figures do not 
suggest that radical labor union locals are more likely support all social organizations, but 
social organizations concerned with Women’s rights and civil rights.  
In terms of women’s rights organizations, the CWA showed a noticeably positive 
difference of opinion compared to UNITE HERE and the SEIU. I extrapolate this idea from 
the Kruskal-Wallis tests concerning the National Organization of Women (fig. 5) and 
Planned Parenthood (fig. 6). What’s important to note is that these two organizations should 
not be considered as one in the same. Specifically, Planned Parenthood is usually associated 
with women’s healthcare (Rosenbaum 2015) and NOW is associated with feminist 
movements (Haussman 2003). Although the CWA respondents in my sample found both of 
these groups more favorable than respondents from UNITE HERE and SEIU, it would be 
reductionist (and rather bold) to simply say that members of the CWA are more likely to 
form coalitions with women’s organizations. Instead, these results suggest that union local 
presidents from the CWA find these organizations to be more agreeable in their personal 
opinions. This is not surprising considering that CWA is the only union in this study that has 
an active public campaign for women’s rights (CWA 2016).  
What is also interesting about this finding is that figures 17 and 18 illustrate that 
CWA, the union with the highest reported male membership rates (with a mean of 56%), is 
more supportive of women’s organizations than SEIU, the union with the lowest reported 
male membership rates (with a mean of 30%). Taking these findings into account can result 
in two different conclusions. One either concludes that there is a spurious relationship 
between a local’s gender makeup and its organizing campaigns, or that measuring the views 
of a union local’s president is spurious with that local’s affiliations. Unfortunately, my study 
cannot give an accurate measure of either of these hypotheses because question five only 
asks if the respondent’s local has participated in an event with the other SMOs, instead of 
asking how many times it has 
done so. 
Secondly, the CWA 
respondents found the Human 
Rights Campaign (HRC) more 
agreeable than respondents 
from other unions. This 
suggests that the CWA 
respondents were more 
sympathetic in terms of civil 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0138         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0276          Pr(T > t) = 0.9862
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  -2.2750
                                                                              
    diff             -21.80526    9.584553               -41.09797   -2.512559
                                                                              
combined        48     47.5625    4.061682    28.14016    39.39145    55.73355
                                                                              
       2        38    52.10526     4.49637    27.71748    42.99475    61.21577
       1        10        30.3    7.474475    23.63637    13.39156    47.20844
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest membership_male, by(seiu)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9757         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0486          Pr(T > t) = 0.0243
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =   2.0261
                                                                              
    diff               15.9965     7.89508                .1045326    31.88847
                                                                              
combined        48     47.5625    4.061682    28.14016    39.39145    55.73355
                                                                              
       2        26    40.23077    4.810664    24.52967    30.32302    50.13852
       1        22    56.22727    6.434126    30.17872    42.84678    69.60777
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest membership_male, by(cwa)
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
rights or LGBTQ rights, because of the ambiguous wording in the name “Human Rights 
Campaign.” One would naturally think that labor organizers such as local presidents would 
be informed about various SMOs, but since the HRCs goals are not apparent in their 
organization’s name I cannot confidently say this.  
What complicates all of this is that the Black Lives Matter movement (fig. 1) nor the 
NAACP (fig. 2) were significantly different among the labor unions surveyed. This as well 
suggests that all three unions in my sample are supportive of racial liberation movements or 
that all three are not significantly supportive of said movements. Whatever the case, the fact 
that difference of support was not significant for Working America (fig. 8) and the Fight for 
15 movement (fig. 2) provides a counter-argument to the common assumption that labor 
unions are exclusively white. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: Labor Unions will be more receptive of decentralized social 
movements than they are of SMOs.  
Unfortunately, the two means T-tests illustrated in figures 9-16 are inconclusive for 
all but three SMOs. This means that both of the social movements that I had asked about in 
my survey did not give me any results that fall into a 95% confidence interval (p < 0.05). 
The groups that did have statistically significant means comparison tests were the three 
SMOs that were discussed in hypothesis one: the Human Rights Campaign, Planned 
Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women. 
However, before admitting some sort of defeat with these test results it should be 
noted that the results of the Black Lives Matter and the Fight for 15 movements suggest that 
not only are social movements unagreed upon, but that they are polarizing in terms of 
opinion. There are a few possible explanations for this, but they all involve not only an 
insignificant sample size but also a skewed sample. This is due to the fact that the Fight for 
15 is a social movement primarily hosted by the SEIU through several different social 
campaigns. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that there is a level of difference in opinion 
concerning the Human Rights Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and the National 
Organization of Women. There are many ideas that can be inferred from these results, but 
the most intuitive of these is that radical labor union locals are more (or more likely to be) 
sympathetic of progressive SMOs that do not deal with issues of race.  
Along with this, while the results of my study failed to reject my second null 
hypothesis, the two social movements measured did not give a specific pattern. In fact, the 
Black Lives Matter and Fight for 15 movements comprised the lowest and highest Likert 
means from this study.  
The results of my study do not give evidence that the CWA (nor radical labor unions 
in general) are not sympathetic to movements and SMOs that deal with issues of race in the 
United States. In fact, there is a recent body of literature that suggests that the rising tide of 
social unionism has resulted in an increase of coalition action between labor unions and a 
whole range of different SMOs. From the United Steelworkers working with Black Lives 
Matter to divestment campaigns on university campuses it is reasonable to question the 
inconclusive results of this study.  
The biggest hole in my research is my lack of interview data. This lack of data it is 
impossible to determine a sociological or psychological link between representative 
opinions and employer influence. Lott (2014) points out that this lack of understanding is 
pervasive in I/O psychology as it is in sociological literature. 
The findings of this study are questionable, and this is due to my study’s small 
sample size. Not only that, but the different organizational structures of the SEIU, UNITE 
HERE, and the CWA make for imperfect comparisons between one another. Lastly, the 
unequal number of respondents from each union distorts the results of the two means 
comparison tests. Despite these issues, the fact that my results concerning the Human Rights 
Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women fall within a 99% 
confidence interval suggests that there is an untapped body of literature involving the 
intersection of the labor and feminist movements. 
 Overall, this study supports a body of literature of social movement unionism. 
Although various obstacles were met during data collection the results from my data suggest 
that there is a significant difference in opinion when it comes to the feminist movement. 
Future sociological and psychological study focusing on these sympathies could result in a 
deeper insight into the study of social movement coalitions. 
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